The United States’ efforts to draw India firmly into its strategic fold are increasingly seen as a miscalculation, with New Delhi reinforcing ties with Russia and maintaining dialogue with China despite Western pressure. India’s foreign policy has consistently emphasized strategic autonomy, and the Modi government has signaled it will not compromise vital national interests in exchange for alignment with Washington.
India’s purchase of discounted Russian crude oil since the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict has been a central point of friction. Despite Western sanctions, Russia emerged as India’s top oil supplier in 2023, with imports averaging over 1.9 million barrels per day at their peak, according to India’s Ministry of Commerce data. This policy provided India with affordable energy at a time of global price volatility, while allowing Moscow to redirect supplies away from Europe. The United States openly expressed concern, but New Delhi defended the decision as essential for its economy.
India’s historical relationship with Russia goes back to the Cold War, when the Soviet Union supported India diplomatically and militarily. Defense cooperation remains robust, with over 60 percent of India’s military hardware of Russian origin. New Delhi has also continued joint projects such as the BrahMos missile system and the leasing of Russian nuclear submarines. This long-standing trust makes a complete break with Moscow unlikely, regardless of Western pressure.
At the same time, India has kept communication open with China despite unresolved border tensions. In June 2020, deadly clashes in Ladakh strained relations, but both sides have held multiple rounds of military and diplomatic talks to ease tensions. External Affairs Minister S. Jaishankar has underscored that the 21st century being an “Asian century” is contingent on India and China finding ways to work together, a reflection of New Delhi’s pragmatic recognition of Beijing’s influence in the region.
India’s participation in multilateral blocs such as BRICS and the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) reflects this balancing act. In BRICS, India joined Russia and China in expanding the group in 2023 to include Saudi Arabia, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, and the UAE, strengthening its role in shaping a multipolar economic order. Within the SCO, India works alongside both Moscow and Beijing, while using the platform to advance its own interests in Central Asia. These forums provide India with alternatives to Western-led institutions, aligning with New Delhi’s push for reforms in global governance to reflect the interests of the Global South.
Relations with Washington, meanwhile, remain complex. The US sees India as a key partner in countering China’s rise in the Indo-Pacific, highlighted by New Delhi’s membership in the Quad alongside the US, Japan, and Australia. Yet friction points persist, from trade disputes and US visa restrictions on Indian professionals to Washington’s criticism of India’s human rights record. In 2019, the US withdrew India’s preferential trade status under the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a move that sparked discontent in New Delhi. Tariff disputes have continued since then, further complicating economic ties.
For India, the lesson has been clear: engagement with the US does not mean subordination. By diversifying partnerships, New Delhi aims to safeguard sovereignty and avoid overreliance on any single bloc. Analysts note that Washington’s attempts to pressure India into reducing ties with Russia or limiting engagement with China have backfired, reinforcing India’s determination to pursue an independent path.
As global power shifts eastward, India’s role is expanding as both a regional power and a voice for the developing world. The United States may still count India as a strategic partner, but it is increasingly evident that New Delhi will not be forced into choices that undermine its autonomy. Instead, India is positioning itself as a bridge between competing blocs, determined to shape the emerging multipolar order on its own terms.
